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Pretrial Detention
I. INTRODUCTION
Pretrial detainees are unconvicted persons who are confined
until trial because they have been accused of nonbailable offenses' or
are unable to post bail. 2 Pretrial detention is an archetypical example
of conflict between important governmental interests and private lib-
erty interests.3 Inevitably, the right of pretrial detainees to be free
1. It has been consistently held that there is no absolute right to have bail set.
See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490, 491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Bloss v. People, 421 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Mastrian v. Hedman,
326 F.2d 708, 710 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (1976), applicable to those
charged with federal crimes, provides that the court need not set bail for one charged
with an offense punishable by death or for one who has an appeal pending after
conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976).
Article 1, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution provides that, prior to convic-
tion, all persons are entitled to have bail set except those acccused of capital crimes.
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Since the death penalty has been abolished in Minnesota,
see Act of April 22, 1911, ch. 387, 1911 Minn. Laws 572, all offenses are now bailable.
See State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 430, 92 N.W.2d 205, 206 (1958).
2. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits only
"excessive" bail. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Bail Reform Act of 1966, however,
requires that a defendant accused of a noncapital federal offense be released on
personal recognizance unless the judicial officer determines that the defendant is un-
likely to appear at trial. In such a case, he may condition pretrial release in any of the
following ways: (a) place the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organ-
ization agreeing to supervise him; (b) place restrictions on his travel, association, or
place of abode during the period of release; (c) require the execution of an appearance
bond in a sum not to exceed ten percent of the amount of the bond; (d) require the
execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties or the deposit of cash in lieu
thereof. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976). In United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171
(D.C. Cir. 1969), the court held that the Bail Reform Act creates a presumption in
favor of release on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appear-
ance bond. Therefore, only when such conditions of release will not reasonably assure
appearance can a surety be demanded. In Minnesota, there is no similar statutory pre-
sumption in favor of release on personal recognizance. See generally MINN. R. CruM.
P. 6.02.
3. Blackstone noted the conflicting values inherent in any analysis of pretrial
detention:
[IJf the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is to be
committed to the county gaol. . . there to abide till delivered by due course
of law. But this imprisonment . . . is only for safe custody, and not for
punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment
and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither
be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as
are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only: though what are
so requisite, must too often be left to the discretion of the gaolers; who are
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from "undue or oppressive"' confinement is compromised by the
state's interest in assuring their presence at trial and maintaining
security in the facilities that hold them.'
Traditionally, courts followed a hands-off policy7 with regard to
challenges of prison conditions by inmates, deferring to the discretion
of prison administrators. The abuses condoned by the hands-off doc-
trine, however, have led courts to respond to the complaints of ag-
grieved prisoners on a routine basis.' In the case of detainees, whose
presence in jail is not predicated on penal considerations,' courts have
been generous in fashioning broad remedial relief.'" The increasing
extent to which courts have involved themselves in reviewing condi-
tions of pretrial detention has raised troublesome issues concerning
the legal status of detainees, the extent to which courts should substi-
tute their judgments for those of jail administrators, and the degree
frequently a merciless race of men, and, by being conversant in scenes of
misery, steeled against any tender sensation.
4 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMENrARmS 297 (Oxford 1769) (footnote omitted).
4. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex
rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d
333, 338 (2d Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1971), modified
en banc, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); cf. Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (limited function of bail requires it be based on standards relevant
to assuring defendant's presence at trial).
6. See, e.g., Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 1978); Main Road v.
Aytch, 565 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir.
1977); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 269 (D. Md. 1972), supplemented, 363
F. Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973); note 85 infra and accompanying text.
7. Many courts asserted that they had no jurisdiction over the administration of
prisons. See, e.g., Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296, 297 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam),
vacated as moot, 384 U.S. 33 (1966); United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965); McCloskey v. State, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir.
1964). See generally Fox, Criminal Law-The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners,
63 J. CRum. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YAmE L.J. 506 (1963).
8. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (first amendment
guarantees violated by prison censorship of mail without due process); Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (first amendment guarantees freedom to reasona-
ble exercise of religion in jail); Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)
(complaint should not be dismissed since placement in solitary confinement affects a
federally protected right).
9. See note 5 supra. See generally Note, Pre-Trial Detention: Constitutional
Standards, 28 ARK. L. Rav. 129 (1974); Note, Discipline in Jails: The Due Process
Rights of Pretrial Detainees, 54 B.U.L. Rxv. 796 (1974); Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention,'79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Constitutional Limitations].
10. See, e.g., Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976); Mitchell v.
Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 1243
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, modi-
fied in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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of deference federal courts should accord the decisions of adminis-
trators of state-run facilities. The major problem underlying these
issues is identifying the appropriate standard of judicial review for
detainee challenges of jailers' administrative decisions.
This Note reviews the brief history of detainee litigation and
concludes that a court's choice between the rational basis and strict
scrutiny standards in such cases should be determined by the general
rule: a regulation need only bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state interest unless it significantly interferes with a fundamen-
tal liberty or burdens a suspect class, in which case it must be justi-
fied by compelling necessity. This Note proposes that, when the con-
ditions challenged by detainees warrant only rational basis review, a
"rational" jail regulation should be defined as one evidencing no
punitive intent.
II. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The hands-off doctrine has been repudiated to the extent that
convicted prisoners now are extended rights that are not inconsistent
with "their status as prisoner[s] [n]or with the legitimate penologi-
cal objectives of the corrections system."" Despite this perspective,
the Supreme Court's handling of convict cases has exhibited a
marked tendency to defer to the expertise of prison administrators.'"
The Court has not yet delineated the legal status of pretrial
detainees, but it is logical that detainees should retain more rights
than convicts since the state's penological objectives do not apply to
those presumed innocent. 3 Some lower courts have predicated judi-
cial intervention on detainees' eighth amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment, 4 or their fourteenth amendment
11. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
12. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
(1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). See generally Calhoun, The Supreme
Court and The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 219 (1977).
13. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir.
1976); Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397
(2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); O'Bryan v. County
of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 595 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp.
567, 574 (D. Neb. 1976); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp.
676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), affl'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977
(1974); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268, 271 (D.N.H. 1972). But see Feeley v.
Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir. 1978). For an explanation of this principle, see
note 87 infra.
14. The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment not only
prohibits punishments grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, see, e.g.,
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
368 (1910), but also forbids certain forms of punishment altogether. See, e.g., Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Trop v.
1979]
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guarantee of procedural due process.15 Neither of these theories, how-
ever, is particularly well suited to detainee challenges of the reasona-
bleness or necessity of the routine conditions of pretrial confine-
ment.'" Substantive due process and equal protection are the consti-
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958). Some courts have implied that any "punishment"
of unconvicted detainees is cruel and unusual. See Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp.
1225, 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (treating detainees worse than convicts considered cruel
and unusual punishment); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (D. Md.
1972) (minimum standard defining cruel and unusual punishment for detainees is
higher than for convicts) (by implication), supplemented, 363 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Md.
1973). Others have more narrowly concluded that conditions so inhumane as to shock
the conscience constitute cruel and unusual punishment for detainees as well as con-
victs. See Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Brenneman v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
15. Procedural due process mandates that before the state may deprive a person
of a significant liberty or property interest, it must afford him certain procedural
safeguards. At minimum, these consist of some reasonable form of notice, see, e.g.,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978); Board of Curators v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1978).
Procedural due process issues are implicated by several aspects of pretrial deten-
tion. First, since pretrial detention compromises the basic liberty to be free from bodily
restraint, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1978), it must be preceded by a
probable cause hearing. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975). Second, addi-
tional deprivations of liberty through special disciplinary measures or transfer to more
restrictive quarters may require additional procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 303 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v.
Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1166-67 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F.
Supp. 257, 273-74 (D. Md. 1972). But cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)
(not every change in the condition of penal confinement having a substantial adverse
impact on prisoners requires additional procedural safeguards). Finally, some courts
have stated that due process requires that detainees be treated as well as convicts
because to do otherwise would be to subject detainees to "punishment" without the
procedural safeguard of a trial. See, e.g., Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567, 571 (D.
Neb. 1976); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649, 669 (S.D. Tex. 1975);
Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F.
Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
16. The cruel and unusual punishment clause is often said not to apply to de-
tainees because, technically, they are being confined, not punished. See Hampton v.
Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1079 (3d Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Anderson v. Nosser, 438
F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir.), modified en banc, 456 F.2d 835, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848
(1972); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (eighth amendment does not
bar corporal punishment in schools). Other courts have withheld judgment on the
eighth amendment's applicability because they have found treatment of detainees in
a "manner shocking to the conscience" to be a clear denial of due process. See Feeley
v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 370 (1st Cir. 1978); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999-1000
(7th Cir. 1976).
A procedural due process challenge to conditions of detainee confinement would
be ineffective because of the remedy available. Under a procedural due process theory,
detention would be unlawful if not preceded by procedural safeguards sufficient to
justify deprivation of liberty. But the remedy would be more formal probable cause
[Vol. 63:457
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tutional foundations detainees have found most useful in mounting
such challenges." Accordingly, this Note confines its analysis of the
proper standard of judicial review to these latter theories.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION
Although substantive due process"8 and equal protection are, of
course, distinct constitutional principles, they have almost identical
ramifications in the context of detainee suits." Both ostensibly utilize
a two-tiered standard of review.20 Normally, courts merely require
that a regulation or legislative classification bear some rational rela-
tion to a legitimate state interest.2' But, whenever a statute or regula-
tion burdens a suspect class 2 or interferes with a fundamental lib-
and bail hearings; the conditions of confinement could remain the same. A successful
substantive due process challenge, by contrast, would require jails to change conditions
of confinement even if the detention itself were conceded to be lawful. See note 18
infra.
17. See, e.g., Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 1978); Duran v.
Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305, 311
(N.D. Ohio 1974).
18. The due process clause "affords not only a procedural guarantee against the
deprivation of 'liberty', but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against
unconstitutional restrictions by the State." Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976).
See also L. TamE, AMEPmcA CONSrrTrONAL LAw 502 & n.4 (1978) (substantive due
process deals with the content of a law or practice, while procedural due process deals
with the adequacy of a law or practice's enforcement procedures).
19. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 379 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, C.J., dis-
senting).
20. The equal protection test has long been understood as being two-tiered.
Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (statutory classification will
not be set aside if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it), with Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (statutory classification that penalizes the exercise
of a fundamental right is unconstitutional unless necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest). The substantive due process test is also moving towards a two-
tiered standard. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973) (fundamental right to
personal privacy includes abortion decision, and regulation of that right must be justi-
fied by compelling state interest). See also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977) (plurality) (Court will closely scrutinize the importance of the govern-
ment's interests when a regulation intrudes on the freedom of choice concerning
family living arrangements). The Supreme Court has warned, however, that strict
scrutiny substantive due process must be applied with caution lest judges lapse back
into the Lochner era practice of substituting their own opinions for the informed judg-
ments of legislators and professional administrators. Id. at 502 & n.9 (citing Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
21. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
22. Recognized "suspect" classifications are usually based on congenital or un-
alterable traits likely to be perceived as a badge of inferiority. See generally Develop-
1979]
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erty,21 courts employ a strict scrutiny standard of review. Under this
standard, the state carries the burden of demonstrating a compelling
necessity for the challenged classification or regulation." Moreover,
in some circumstances, the state must show that the classification or
regulation is the "least restrictive means" of achieving its goal.2
Commentators have suggested that courts engaging in equal pro-
tection review have developed an intermediate standard that is more
rigorous than rational basis but less demanding than strict scrutiny.28
The hallmark of this standard is that the court's choice of the rational
basis rubric is not outcome-determinative in favor of the challenged
law or regulation. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
acknowledged the existence of such an intermediate standard, it has
implicitly done so in cases in which it has explained the rationality
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1126-27 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Developments]. The Supreme Court has recognized three suspect
classes. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
646 (1948) (ancestry).
23. Fundamental liberties are defined by the "teachings of history" and the
"solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Generally, these rights are either
explicit in the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (right
to vote); implicit in it, see, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (freedom
of association); or "penumbral" to it. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54
(1973) (right to personal privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right
to procreate). A fundamental liberty may also arise, by necessity, from the nation's
federal structure. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (right
to travel interstate).
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
25. "'Strict review'. . seems to entail ... a requirement that the challenged
classification be strictly relevant to whatever purpose is claimed by the state to justify
its use, and also that it be the fairest and least restrictive alternative evidently avail-
able for the pursuit of that purpose . . . " Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7, 20 n.34 (1969). The Supreme Court has often used the least restrictive
means test when fundamental liberties have been significantly abridged. See, e.g.,
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408
U.S. 92, 102 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
In detainee cases, "least restrictive means" and "compelling necessity" inter-
changeably signify that the court is applying a strict scrutiny standard. See Feeley v.
Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 379 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
26. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 24-37 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classi-
fications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974).
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test as requiring a substantial relation between a challenged law and
some legitimate governmental purpose.Y
IV. APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION THEORIES IN DETAINEE SUITS
The federal courts' involvement in detainee challenges of jail
administration has followed three distinct trends. The earliest deci-
sions called for the rational basis standard of review in all cases
except those challenging conditions of confinement that affected fun-
damental liberties. In 1971, the courts began to shift toward a rule
requiring strict scrutiny of every condition of pretrial confinement.
Recent Supreme Court cases, however, have implicitly undermined
the strict scrutiny approach, and within the last year, several courts
have reinstated the rational basis test as the proper standard of re-
view in detainee cases.
Before 1971, courts generally adhered to the rule that conditions
of pretrial detention need be only rationally related to the state's
legitimate interest in assuring the accused's presence at trial.2s An
exception was recognized, however, where a challenged condition
significantly interfered with a detainee's exercise of a fundamental
liberty. In such a case, the interference had to be the least restrictive
means capable of satisfying the state's limited interest in pretrial
detention.2 1
The cases of Seale v. Manson" and Palmigiano v. Travisono31
illustrate the general rule and the exception. In Seale, the court held
that a jail regulation forbidding beards would be reviewed only for
reasonableness, since a beard was not "communicative" enough to
warrant strict scrutiny protection under the first amendment. 2 In
27. "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)); see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 & n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
28. See Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (D. Conn. 1971) (memoran-
dum); Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Bloeth v. Cyrta, 39
Misc. 2d 1039, 1040, 242 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1963); cf. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d
710, 715 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966) (distinction between detainees
and persons free on bail is reasonable).
29. See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D.R.I. 1970) (denial of
fundamental first amendment rights by mail censorship); Tyler v. Ciccone, 299 F.
Supp. 684, 688 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (denial of fundamental first amendment rights by
refusing to permit detainee to submit manuscripts in excess of six thousand words to
publisher).
30. 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971).
31. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
32. 326 F. Supp. at 1380. This aspect of Seale has been overruled by implication.
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Palmigiano, the court held that jail officials must show both that a
"compelling justification"33 exists for interfering with a detainee's
fundamental first amendment right to correspond through the mail
and that such interference was the least restrictive alternative avail-
able. " As a result, the court would not sanction total censorship of a
detainee's mail, but it did permit jail officials to limit a detainee's
uncensored mail to an "approved addressee list"35 of seven persons.
The court held that the jail's selection of names for this list would
be reviewable only to ensure its rational relationship to the legitimate
purposes of pretrial confinement.
A 1964 district court decision, Butler v. Crumlish,37 seems anom-
olous because of its broad assertion that conditions of pretrial deten-
tion that do not "inhere in confinement" are unlawful., This stan-
dard requires that jail regulations be more than merely rational." The
Butler court held that requiring detainees to appear in police line-ups
for crimes other than the one for which they were detained is "un-
related" to assuring their presence at trial."
Since the Butler court decided that the regulation in question
was irrational, its apparent support for the least restrictive means
test was simply dictum. Moreover, the Butler court adopted a very
expansive view of the conditions that inhere in confinement and thus
need be subject only to a rational basis standard of review:
The prison authorities ... may subject a criminal defendant who
is imprisoned for want of bail to all those restraints which are an
essential part of the management of a prison. Thus, pending trial,
such a defendant may be imprisoned in a cell and must submit to
the routine of the prison relating to his meals, his exercise and the
many activities of his daily life. All these matters are. . incidental
elements in the organized caretaking of the general company of
prisoners."
Butler, then, despite its confusing definition of detainee rights, is not
inconsistent with the other detainee cases of this period; it would
apply the rational relation test to challenged prison regulations in all
See Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. 317 F. Supp. at 786.
34. Id. at 786 n.35.
35. Id. at 791.
36. Id.
37. 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
38. Id. at 567.
39. See Constitutional Limitations, supra note 9, at 948-49. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals later criticized this "broad holding" of the Butler decision. See Rig-
ney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 715 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966).
40. 229 F. Supp. at 567.
41. Id. at 566.
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but exceptional circumstances.
The second trend in detainee cases developed following the pub-
lication of an influential Yale Law Journal note" in 1970. The note-
writer argued that, when considered in light of the freedom accorded
to arrested persons released on bail, all restrictions placed on de-
tainees must be rationally related to the state'spurpose in holding
them for trial, or their detainment would constitute a denial of equal
protection.43 Citing jury sequestration," medical quarantine,15 and
civil commitment"6 cases as analogous, the notewriter went on to
conclude that "where a person has not been convicted of a crime, any
deprivation of his liberty by the state must be the least restrictive
means of achieving the purpose of the deprivation."47 The innovative
aspect of this rule was that a significant interference with a funda-
mental liberty was not made a prerequisite for application of strict
scrutiny. It was, therefore, a marked departure from the rule ob-
served in the early detainee cases,4" and from Supreme Court appli-
42. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 9.
43. Id. at 950.
44. Id. at 949 & n. 61. The cited jury sequestration cases refer to the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial, not the jurors' right to be free from the deprivation
of liberty occasioned by the sequestration. See Hines v. United States, 365 F.2d 649,
651 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 351-53 (7th Cir. 1963);
Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (unsequestered jury mem-
bers should be admonished not to communicate with others so that defendant's right
to impartial trial is protected).
45. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 9, at 949 n.61. The notewriter cited
In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. 239 (1919), a case holding that "quarantine measures may
be resorted to only as are reasonably necessary to protect the public health, remember-
ing that the persons so affected are to be treated as patients and not criminals." Id.
at 244 (emphasis added). The notewriter apparently took the phrase "reasonably nec-
essary" to signify something similar to the least restrictive means test. In at least one
detainee case, however, the "reasonably necessary" formula has been used to signify
the rational relation standard. See Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999, 1000 (7th Cir.
1976).
46. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 9, at 949 & n. 62; see Covington v.
Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (least restrictive means test mandated by
Constitution); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (least restrictive
means test mandated by civil commitment statute).
It should be observed, however, that the rationale for the least restrictive means
test in civil commitment cases is that the commitment process is intended to benefit
the person committed. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Thus,
civil commitment is generally regarded as an incident of the state's parens patriae
power. See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
11, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1201-07 (1974); Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a
Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 44
U. CHi. L. REv. 562, 564 (1977). In pretrial detention cases, however, individuals are
incarcerated under the state's police power not to benefit themselves, but to benefit
society by assuring their presence at trial.
47. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 9, at 949.
48. See text accompanying notes 28-41 supra.
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cations of the least restrictive means test to such significant inter-
ference. "
The proposed rule was, nevertheless, immediately adopted by
several federal district courts." Its attraction was no doubt due in
part to its implied assumption that pretrial detention is, by itself, a
significant interference with constitutionally protected liberties.' In
addition, the rule afforded persons detained in state-run facilities an
avenue for escaping the abstention doctrine set forth in Johnson v.
Avery:52 "There is no doubt that discipline and administration of
state detention facilities are state functions. They are subject to fed-
eral authority only where paramount federal constitutional or statu-
tory rights supervene.""3
During this period, the blanket application of strict scrutiny to
every condition of pretrial detention became the clear majority rule.'
49. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973) ("As our past decisions make
clear, a significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified upon
a mere showing of a legitimate state interest." (emphasis added)), with Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("Not every limitation or incidental burden on the
exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review.") (citing Mc-
Donald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)).
50. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323
F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972).
51. See Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 130-31 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
52. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
53. Id. at 486.
54. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977), see text accompanying notes 69-87 infra, the
majority rule had been adopted in the following circuits:
First Circuit. See Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 593 (D.P.R.),
affl'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); Bel v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274, 276 (D. Mass. 1975);
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973),
affl'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974). But see Smith v.
Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268, 271 (D.N.H. 1972) (right to particular hairstyle not so
fundamental as to require a "compelling" showing before it may be impaired by the
state).
Second Circuit. See Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm,
520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in
part, modified in part, 573 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish,
99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). But see Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (least
restrictive means test applies only if first amendment rights are abridged); Seale v.
Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (D. Conn. 1971) (rationality standard applied). The
Seale decision has been overruled by implication. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364,
378 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
Fifth Circuit. See Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 1977); Pugh v.
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Although some courts announced a rule that applied strict scrutiny
only to those conditions that did not inhere in confinement,5 those
courts applied their rule as if it called for blanket strict scrutiny. Only
three circuits retained the earlier rule that reserved strict scrutiny for
conditions significantly interfering with fundamental liberties.56
Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1977) (strict scrutiny premised on findings
that detainees are suspect class and that fundamental right to be presumed innocent
is abridged by detention), vacated as moot, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978); Taylor v.
Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 470 n.11, 471 (5th Cir. 1976) (strict scrutiny premised on
abridgement of fundamental right of access to courts); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.
Supp. 886, 893-94 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
Sixth Circuit. See O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 595 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Jones v.
Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd sub noma. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
Eighth Circuit. See Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 897-98 (W.D. Mo. 1977),
aff'd in relevant part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567,
571 (D. Neb. 1976); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Ninth Circuit. See Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225, 1235 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
55. See Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392,
397 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974); Ahrens v.
Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 897-98 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd in relevant part, 570 F.2d
286 (8th Cir. 1978); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Chief Judge Coffin of the First Circuit, dissenting in Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d
364 (1st Cir. 1978), summarized the majority rule as follows: "Deprivations may be
imposed on detainees for legitimate purposes such as institutional security only if such
deprivations are justified by 'compelling necessity'. . or if the deprivation is the least
restrictive alternative available to maintain order and security. . . ."Id. at 379 (Cof-
fin, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Coffin's dissent recognizes that, regardless
of the particular formula used to express the rule, courts following the strict scrutiny
standard have applied it to every aspect of pretrial confinement without trying to
determine whether any particular condition may actually inhere in confinement.
56. The rule in the Seventh Circuit is that the conditions of pretrial detention
must be reasonably related to the state's interest in assuring the accused's presence
at trial. See Bijeol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1978); Duran v. Elrod, 542
F.2d 998, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 1976); Classon v. Krautkramer, 451 F. Supp. 12, 14 (E.D.
Wis. 1977); Vienneau v. Shanks, 425 F. Supp. 676, 680 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Jordan v.
Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696, 700 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The Seventh Circuit does, however, apply
strict scrutiny to conditions of pretrial detention that affect fundamental first amend-
ment liberties. See Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1977). But see Vienneau
v. Shanks, 425 F. Supp. 676, 680 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (rational relation test deemed
appropriate for reviewing jail officials' practice of spot-checking detainee mail).
Vienneau may indicate that the Seventh Circuit courts reserve strict scrutiny for
conditions that significantly affect fundamental liberties. See text accompanying notes
66-68 infra.
Although the Third Circuit has not stated its rule as plainly as has the Seventh,
its practice of deferring to the decisions of jail administrators and placing the burden
of proof on detainees are consistent with the rational relation test. See Main Road v.
Aytch, 565 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 1977) (deferral to prison authorities' discretion appro-
priate unless pretrial detainees produce substantial evidence that jail officials have
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The third, and present, trend in detainee cases arose as a result
of two Supreme Court decisions involving the rights of convicted
prisoners, Pell v. Procunier57 and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, Inc.5" In Pell, the plaintiffs"9 challenged a California
Department of Corrections regulation barring convicted inmates from
face-to-face interviews with media representatives." Because other
avenues of communication with the news media remained open to the
inmates, the regulation did not absolutely deny their ability to air
grievances in public. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation, con-
cluding that inmates retain no first amendment right to engage in
face-to-face interviews.6 1
exaggerated their responses to security concerns); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison
Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1976) (placing burden on detainees to produce
evidence of intentional conduct or deliberate indifference on part of defendant in order
to sustain charge of due process infringement); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker,
535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976) (state violates due process clause by arbitrarily impos-
ing materially greater restrictions on detainees than on convicts in same facility). But
see Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1978). The Third Circuit
has also held that the restrictions placed on detainees are rational and do not deny
them equal protection as compared to persons free on bail. See Priest v. Nardini, 390
F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 715 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966).
In addition, the Fourth Circuit appears to follow the minority rule. The only case
on point, Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972), supplemented, 363
F. Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973), states that "a pretrial detainee may not be disciplined
in any way except to the extent reasonably required in order to insure his presence at
trial and to maintain the order and security of the institution." 344 F. Supp. at 269.
But, when fundamental liberties were at stake, the Collins court, like the Seventh
Circuit, placed the burden of showing "necessity" on the jail officials. Id. at 271, 283.
In a case involving convicted prisoners, Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977),
the court held that "the State has a compelling interest in assuring the security of
its prisons and. . . whenever that need conflicts with the rights of prisoners the latter
must yield." Id. at 188.
57. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
58. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
59. In Pell, two cases were consolidated for oral argument. Plaintiffs were four
California prison inmates in one case (No. 73-754), and three professional journalists
in the other (No. 73-918).
60. Section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual, quoted
in 417 U.S. at 819, provided that "[p]ress and other media interviews with specific
individual inmates will not be permitted." The regulation was enacted in response to
a violent prison episode that prison officials believed was due in part to certain in-
mates gaining disproportionate notoriety among their fellows by virtue of media inter-
views. Id.
61. 417 U.S. at 828. The Court assumed that the right of free speech "includes a
right to communicate a person's views to any willing listener, including a willing
representative of the press for the purpose of publication by a willing publisher." Id.
at 822. But it stated that the prohibition of a specific means of communication, so long
as viable alternatives were left open, does not necessarily raise a constitutional issue.
Id. at 823. The regulation in Pell prohibited only face-to-face interviews; the Court
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Pell is significant because the Supreme Court declined to apply
strict scrutiny even though a first amendment question had been
raised. Although admitting a constitutional duty to "delineate and
protect fundamental liberties,""2 Justice Stewart's majority opinion
notes that "'[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights.' "63 The Court
thus held that given the unique nature of the prison environment,
the refusal to permit face-to-face interviews was a reasonable "time,
place, and manner" regulation" that did not "abridge any First
Amendment freedoms retained by prison inmates." 5
The Court has often indicated that to warrant strict scrutiny, the
deprivation of a fundamental liberty must be significant. 6 Pell dem-
onstrates that this level of significance varies according to the envi-
ronment being regulated. Since the Court conceded that this regula-
tion would raise a first amendment question if applied to the general
public,6" the import of Pell's holding is that the security concerns
related to the special environment of prisons render the regulation too
insubstantial to warrant strict scrutiny. The penal considerations
that justify the higher threshhold of significance for convicted prison-
ers include deterrence, rehabilitation, and institutional security. 8
The ambiguity of Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, Inc.,"6 decided by the Supreme Court three years after Pell,
makes it difficult to determine whether Jones was intended only
as a restatement of Pell, or as an announcement of a totally new
theory.7" The plaintiff in Jones, a labor union formed to improve
prison working conditions through collective bargaining, had organ-
ized more than 2,000 inmates in forty separate North Carolina prison
units." In an effort to curtail the union's growing influence, the North
believed inmates were left with other viable means of communicating with publishers:
directly through the mail or indirectly through visitations with family, attorneys,
clergy, and similar persons. Id. at 824-26.
The Court did not hold that there exists no constitutional right to face-to-face
interviews, but rather that it is not necessarily retained upon entering prison. Id. at
828.
62. Id. at 827.
63. Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
64. Id. at 826.
65. Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
66. See note 49 supra.
67. 417 U.S. at 825.
68. Id. at 822-23. See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
69. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
70. The new theory would be that the fundamental liberties doctrine, no longer
applies to convicted prisoners, thus amounting to a de facto reinstatement of the dis-
credited "hands off" doctrine. See id. at 139-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
generally Calhoun, supra note 12.
71. 433 U.S. at 122.
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Carolina Department of Corrections prohibited inmates from solicit-
ing their fellows to join the union, from holding union meetings, and
from receiving and distributing the union's bulk mailings.72 The
plaintiff complained that such regulations infringed the union's, and
its members', constitutionally protected liberties of association, free
speech, and assembly." The Supreme Court, reversing a three-judge
district court that had invalidated the regulations, 4 held that the ban
on inmate solicitation and group meetings was rationally related to
the reasonable objectives of prison administration,75 and that the
ban on bulk mailings was reasonable given the other avenues of
"informational flow" open to the union and its members."
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, emphasized two
points. First, he criticized the district court for failing to give appro-
priate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and for
failing to recognize the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of
penal confinement.7 Second, he concluded that on the facts of the
case, the proper standard of judicial review was the rational relation
test, not strict scrutiny.78
Jones probably represents a harsher version of the Pell theory,
rather than a total abrogation of the fundamental liberties doctrine
insofar as it applies to convicts. For instance, Justice Rehnquist
72. Id.
73. Id. at 122-23.
74. The lower court held, inter alia, that since the jail had permitted member-
ship in the union, it could not forbid inmate solicitation of other inmates for member-
ship. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937, 944 (E.D.N.C.
1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). It also held that since organizations other than the
union were permitted to mail literature into the jail at bulk rates, it would be a denial
of equal protection to forbid the union this privilege. Id. Finally, it held that the union
must be given the same right to assemble as other inmate organizations. Id. at 945.
75. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, stated that "[tihe
ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings . . . was rationally related to the
reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration." 433 U.S. at 129
(emphasis added) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)). In Pell, the Court
listed four legitimate objectives of penal confinement-deterrence, protection of the
public from further criminal acts, rehabilitation, and internal security-and deemed
the internal security interest to be "central to all other considerations." 417 U.S. at
822-23. Justice Rehnquist's approval of the challenged regulations thus seems to turn
primarily on their rational relationship to security concerns. It is noteworthy that the
state's interest in security is the only one of the four penal objectives outlined in Pell
that also applies to detainees. See note 87 infra.
76. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the ban on bulk mailing privileges was only
the loss of a "cost advantage" that did not "fundamentally implicate free speech
values." 433 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis in original). This was simply another way of
stating the conclusion that the regulation did not meet the requisite level of signifi-
cance for the application of strict scrutiny.
77. Id. at 125.
78. Id. at 127-28.
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observed that "First Amendment speech rights are barely implicated
in this case."79 And the Chief Justice, in a concurring opinion, stated
that the Court's reluctance to second-guess jail administrators "does
not imply that a prisoner is stripped of all constitutional protection
as he passes through the prison's gates. Indeed, this Court has made
clear on numerous occasions that the Constitution and other federal
laws protect certain basic rights of inmates."8 Jones' importance,
then, lies in its assertion that courts are ill-equipped to deal with the
problems of prison administration and reform,"' and should not
second-guess the informed decisions of state legislatures or adminis-
trators in this sensitive field, except under extraordinary circumstan-
ces.82
Although Pell and Jones unquestionably signal a retreat from
intensive judicial supervision of prison administration, their ration-
ales have only limited application to pretrial detention. Since de-
tainees are presumed innocent, their confinement must not be for
"penal" purposes such as retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation."
Yet, the Court in Pell identified "penal" considerations as the major
factor justifying curtailment of prisoner liberties.
There are, however, other aspects of the Pell and Jones rationales
that may be applied to judicial review of prison administration with-
out regard to the convict-detainee distinction. For instance, because
the need for security provisions, including a daily regimen regarding
meals, exercise, and the like, is not based on penal considerations,
such measures should apply to unconvicted inmates with the same
force as to convicted ones." Furthermore, regardless of the legal sta-
tus of the incarcerated persons, Jones' requirement that federal
courts should ordinarily abstain from intervening in state-run institu-
tions would still apply.
79. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 137 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
81. Id. at 126, 136.
82. Id. at 137 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
83. See note 87 infra.
84. 417 U.S. at 822-23.
85. Under certain circumstances, the need for adequate security provisions may
apply with even greater force to detainees than convicts. For example, in Feeley v.
Sampson, 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978), plaintiff detainees, all accused felons, were
subjected to harsher security provisions than a group of convicted misdemeanants
housed in the same jail. The court held, inter alia,
[Wihile the treatment of other prisoners is relevant to whether or not a
detainee is being treated with unnecessary restrictiveness, it is not conclu-
sive. Facilities for short-term jail prisoners need not be as comprehensive
... as those provided for one serving a term of years. A detainee with a
notorious record as a bank robber may not be entitled to as lenient security
considerations as someone serving a misdemeanor sentence.
Id. at 371. See also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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These considerations suggest that the majority rule in detainee
cases-that every deprivation of liberty associated with pretrial de-
tention be strictly scrutinized5 -is no longer tenable. In addition, it
would seem that courts adjudicating detainee rights can no longer
ignore the Pell-Jones "significance" theory, for it is evident that the
security requirements that accompany pretrial confinement necessar-
ily result in curtailment of certain detainee liberties. The Pell-Jones
reliance on penal considerations to justify many conditions of con-
finement, however, seems to suggest that the threshold for significant
deprivations of detainee liberties should not be as high as it is for
convicts."1
Since Jones, several detainee cases have been decided by the
circuit courts. 8 Two of them, Feeley v. Sampson"9 and Wolfish v.
Levi, 0 consider at length the appropriate scope of judicial review.
Significantly, both Feeley and Wolfish avoid application of the blan-
ket strict scrutiny rule. Apparently, both courts concluded that, after
Pell and Jones, certain conditions of pretrial detention need only
have a rational basis. The noteworthy difference between Feeley and
86. See text accompanying notes 42-55 supra.
87. In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), Justice Stewart explained the penal
considerations underlying the "necessary withdrawal or limitation" of liberties occa-
sioned by lawful incarceration:
An important function of the corrections system is the deterrence of crime.
The premise is that by confining criminal offenders in a facility where they
are isolated from the rest of society, .-. . they . . . will be deterred from
committing additional criminal offenses. This isolation, of course, also serves
a protective function by quarantining criminal offenders for a given period
of time while, it is hoped, the rehabilitative processes of the corrections
system work to correct the offender's demonstrated criminal proclivity ....
Finally, central to all other correction goals is the institutional consideration
of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.
Id. at 822-23. Although the state's interest in maintaining secure jails certainly applies
to detainees, see note 85 supra and accompanying text, it is beyond question that the
penal interests of deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation do not apply to pretrial de-
tainees. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1976); Moore v. Janing, 427
F. Supp. 567, 571 (D. Neb. 1976); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (C.D.
Cal. 1975); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Seale v. Man-
son, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Conn. 1971). The penal objectives that justify with-
drawing convicts' rights do not, for the most part, apply to detainees; detainees thus
should retain certain rights that are withdrawn from convicts.
88. See Marcera v. Chinlund, No. 78-2081 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 1979); Bell v. Man-
son, 590 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1978); Bijeol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1978);
DiMarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 312 (1978); Wolfish v.
Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub noma. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76
(1978) (No. 77-1829); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364 (lst Cir. 1978); Ahrens v.
Thomas, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Main Road v. Aytch, 565 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1978).
89. 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978).
90. 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub noma. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76
(1978) (No. 77-1829).
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Wolfish is that they advocate significantly different formulae for de-
termining whether the rational basis standard is appropriate for a
given condition.
In Feeley, plaintiff detainees challenged jail regulations banning
contact visits" and social telephone calls, 2 providing for mail censor-
ship, 3 and forbidding the possession of any personal property in
cells." The district court, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated the
regulations. 5 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part,
holding that the proper standard of review was whether such regula-
tions were arbitrary and capricious, or lacking in reasonable relation
to the limited purpose for which unconvicted persons may be con-
fined."
Applying this standard, the court of appeals concluded that the
ban on contact visits was rational for security reasons." It held, how-
ever, that the jail's failure to promulgate any meaningful rules gov-
erning visitation was unreasonable, since it permitted jail officials to
exercise arbitrary control over the visitation process."8 The circuit
court reversed a lower court order requiring that detainees be per-
mitted to make ten social telephone calls per day,9 remanding the
issue for determination of whether the jail's complete ban on social
calls was reasonable.'" Also reversed was an order that the jail refrain
from opening detainee mail without a search warrant.'"' Finally, the
court held that the jail's ban on possession of personal property in
cells was unreasonable.9 2
91. Detainees were not permitted to touch their visitors, being separated from
them by a mesh screen. 570 F.2d at 372.
92. Id. at 373-74.
93. The jail censored detainees' incoming and outgoing mail. If detainees did not
sign a statement consenting to mail censorship, their mail was withheld entirely. Id.
at 367.
94. Id. at 375.
95. Id. at 368.
96. Id. at 371.
97. The district court had determined that the jail's denial of contact visits was
unlawful because such visits were permitted at the New Hampshire State Prison. The
circuit court concluded, however, that the physical differences between the jail and
state prison rendered the denial of contact visits at the jail non-arbitrary. Id. at 373.
98. Prior to the litigation, visits were permitted twice a week between one and
three o'clock in the afternoon. During the trial, the jail amended its regulation so that
visits were permitted "at all reasonable times." The circuit court found this amended
regulation faulty because it gave jail administrators arbitrary control, on an ad hoc
basis, over visitation. Id. at 372.
99. The circuit court held that it was incorrect to compare the freedom of those
on bail and of detainees, and to place the burden of justification entirely on the state.
Id. at 373.
100. Id. at 374.
101. Id. The court recognized mail censorship as a reasonable security measure
for both detainees and convicts.
102. The district court had ordered the jail to prepare a list of items of personal
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The Feeley decision is significant for several reasons. First, the
court explicitly disavowed the blanket strict scrutiny rule that had
been applied by district courts of the First Circuit on several prior
occasions.'01 Second, the court's minimization of the fundamental
first amendment issue inherent in the mail censorship and visitation
regulations indicated acceptance of the Pell-Jones significance the-
ory."0 4 Finally, the Feeley court read Pell and Jones as mandating
a return to the minority rule that strict scrutiny should be reserved
for those conditions of confinement that significantly interfere with
the exercise of a fundamental liberty.105
In Wolfish v. Levi, 08 decided only six days after Feeley, plaintiff
detainees challenged twenty specific jail conditions and regulations
related to overcrowding, unreasonable searches, censorship, and ac-
cess to courts. As in Feeley, the district court in Wolfish applied the
majority rule of blanket strict scrutiny. 07 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed in part, modifying the rule's operation to no
longer require strict scrutiny of every condition of confinement:
[Piretrial detainees may be subjected to only those "restrictions
and privations" which "inhere in their confinement itself or which
are justified by compelling necessities of jail administration.".
[But] once it has been determined that the mere fact of
confinement of the detainee justifies the restrictions, the institution
must be permitted to use reasonable means to insure that its legiti-
mate interests in security are safeguarded. °8
property that could be kept in cells, using as a standard the list in effect at the New
Hampshire State Prison. The circuit court remanded the order because in issuing it,
the district court ignored the differences in the two facilities and their inmate popula-
tions. Id. at 375.
103. See Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 593 (D.P.R.), aff'd,
537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); Bel v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274, 276 (D. Mass. 1975); Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
104. 570 F.2d at 372, 374.
105. The Feeley court's holding is limited since it proceeded under the assump-
tion that the challenged regulations did not significantly interfere with any fundamen-
tal liberties retained by the plaintiffs. Id. at 370, 372. There is nothing in the Feeley
decision to indicate that the court would eschew the strict scrutiny standard if a
fundamental liberty retained by the plaintiffs had been significantly abridged. Thus,
Feeley should be read as announcing the minority rule-that the rational relation
standard is appropriate so long as no fundamental liberty is significantly abridged-as
it is already followed in the Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits. See note 56 supra.
106. 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76
(1978) (No. 77-1829).
107.. See United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd in part, modified in part, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.), cert granted sub nom.
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829).
108. 573 F.2d at 124 (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir.
1974)).
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The Wolfish opinion manifests ample awareness of two dangers
associated with the overly broad use of strict scrutiny: encouraging
excessive or trivial litigation,09 and permitting courts to make diffi-
cult substantive judgments in areas in which they lack sufficient ex-
pertise."0 The court in Wolfish implied that, of the issues it decided
on appeal, some may have been so trivial as not to warrant judicial
attention."' Moreover, it expressed the realistic fear that courts were
becoming a forum of first resort for the resolution of institutional
grievances despite the ready availability of sufficient internal admin-
istrative procedures." 2 Finally, the circuit court identified two dis-
trict court orders as arbitrary, explicable only as judicial second-
guessing of rational administrative decisions."'
Feeley and Wolfish represent two alternative postures that
109. In his [trial court] decree, Judge Frankel intervened broadly into
almost every facet of the [Metropolitan Correctional Center] .... [I]n
[some] cases we believe a balance more restrained should have been struck
between the court's power to redress inmate grievances and deference to
prison administrators. Many of the cited deficiencies, if indeed they existed,
were not of a kind to require a chancellor's decree to bring about compliance.
... After wading through the many aspects of this decree, we can only
implore the litigants in this case to avoid this increasingly acute problem of
"litigation neurosis" in future disputes by resolving petty problems in the
administrative arenas, without burdening our courts.
Id. at 121 (footnote omitted). In conclusion, the Wolfish court said:
In actuality, we have here decided not one, but twenty cases relating to
specific conditions at the [Metropolitan Correctional Center]. That fact, in
all candor, is ominous, for it represents the growing involvement of the courts
in all aspects of prison administration....
• . . It is important for courts to involve themselves with those condi-
tions that violate the Constitution. But it is equally important that courts
be spared from adjudicating petty matters that do not rise to litigable magni-
tude ....
Id. at 133-34 (footnote omitted).
110. "[Clourts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems
of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more
than a healthy sense of realism." Id. at 124 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 405 (1974)). "Concern with minutiae of prison administration can only distract
the court from detached consideration of the one overriding question presented to it:
does the practice or condition violate the Constitution?" Id. at 125.
111. Id. at 121, 125, 132-34.
112. Id. at 121.
113. Id. at 132-33. Judge Frankel had decreed at the trial court level that inmates
should be permitted to possess typewriters for their personal use, but the circuit court
could perceive of no constitutional right justifying such an order. Frankel had also
ordered that detainees be permitted to wear their own clothes because he found the
prison-issued jumpsuits to be "garish, illfitting, degrading and humiliating to wear."
Id. at 132. The circuit court granted that some detainees may find the jumpsuits
"aesthetically obnoxious," but decided that such questions of personal taste do not rise
to litigable magnitude, especially when a uniform is necessary for the security purpose
of identifying inmates. Id. at 133.
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courts have assumed in reaction to Jones. Although Feeley jettisoned
the majority rule altogether, Wolfish attempted to salvage it by
slightly narrowing its application. Both decisions are symptomatic of
the uncertainty created by Pell and Jones.
Arguably, there now exist four possible formulations of the pro-
per standard for judicial review in detainee cases. At one extreme is
the extant"' majority rule that subjects every deprivation of liberty
associated with pretrial detention to strict scrutiny. This formulation
no longer seems viable because it fails to take account of the ration-
ales of Pell and Jones.' At the opposite extreme is a rule that could
be inferred from Justice Marshall's construction of the majority opin-
ion in Jones: the conditions of pretrial detention need only be ration-
ally related to the state's interest in confinement even if they work a
substantial interference with a fundamental liberty."' This rule
would be premised on the questionable hypothesis that Jones rejects
the fundamental liberties doctrine insofar as prison inmates are con-
cerned."7 But, even in the unlikely event that Jones destroyed that
doctrine's applicability for convicted inmates, it is difficult to justify
applying such a harsh rule to detainees.' Since both these extreme
standards are implausible, the proper rule is undoubtedly one of the
two intermediate standards proposed by Feeley"' and Wolfish. 120
114. For a list of courts following the majority rule prior to Jones, see note 54
supra. Since Jones, the First Circuit has explicitly rejected the majority rule. See
Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit has reaffirmed
its adherence to the minority rule, see Main Road v. Aytch, 565 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir.
1977), as has the Seventh Circuit. See Bijeol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir.
1978). In the Ninth Circuit, where no detainee cases have been heard at the appellate
level, the latest district court opinion applies the rational basis test, see Stewart v.
Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583, 585 (C.D. Cal. 1978), without reference to an earlier case,
decided in the same district, that had applied strict scrutiny. See Dillard v. Pitchess,
399 F. Supp. 1225, 1235 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a diluted form of the majority
rule. See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bell v.
Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829). The Eighth Circuit has retained the undi-
luted form of the majority rule. See Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 897-98 (W.D.
Mo. 1977), aff'd in relevant part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978).
115. See text accompanying notes 57-87 infra.
116. Justice Marshall expressed the fear that the Court's decision in Jones vi-
tiated the fundamental liberties doctrine as applied to convicted prisoners. See Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 141, 147 (1977) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). See also Calhoun, supra note 12.
117. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 141, 147
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Because such a rule would rely heavily on the penal objectives of confine-
ment, see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974), it would contravene the
principle that detainees may not be punished. See note 87 supra.
119. The Feeley rule is a rational basis test that reserves strict scrutiny for
conditions of confinement significantly interfering with fundamental liberties. See
notes 91-105 supra and accompanying text.
120. The Wolfish rule is a strict scrutiny test that reserves the rational basis test
for conditions inhering in confinement. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
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V. ANALYSIS OF FEELEY AND WOLFISH
A. DOCTRINAL INCONSISTENCY OF THE Wolfish RuLE
Strict scrutiny is appropriate only where a law or regulation bur-
dens a suspect class or significantly interferes with a fundamental
liberty.'' Detainees have never been recognized as a suspect class.' 2
Thus, for the Wolfish rule to comport with constitutional doctrine, it
must implicitly equate the "not inherent in the mere fact of confine-
ment" formula to some significant interference with a fundamental
liberty.
One early detainee case suggested that the "extraordinary depri-
vation of liberty" occasioned by pretrial detention is sufficient to
justify strict scrutiny.'' 3 While this explanation arguably supports the
majority rule of blanket strict scrutiny, it cannot logically underlie
the Wolfish rule. The extraordinary deprivation of liberty rationale
would command that every aspect of pretrial detention be viewed as
a significant interference with a fundamental liberty, whether it in-
heres in confinement or not. The Wolfish court, however, held that
conditions inhering in confinement need only have a rational basis.2 4
The most probable statement of the fundamental liberty under-
lying Wolfish would be the liberty to be free from state imposed
punishment prior to conviction.I2 The fifth and sixth amendments do
121. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
122. Under existing doctrine, detainees do not qualify as a suspect class because
they are not classified on the basis of an immutable or congenital characteristic. See
generally Developments, supra note 22, at 1126-27. In McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969), the Court rejected the argument that detainees
should be treated as a suspect class. But see Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1197
(5th Cir. 1977)(detainees are suspect class because quality of their access to courts is
conditioned on their poverty), vacated as moot, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
124. See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829).
125. That some courts have presumed the existence of such a fundamental lib-
erty is implicit in a number of detainee decisions. See, e.g., Moore v. Janing, 427 F.
Supp. 567, 574 (D. Neb. 1976); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225, 1232-34 (C.D.
Cal. 1975); Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
There is another fundamental liberty that could justify strict scrutiny of pretrial
detention conditions: the guarantee against "excessive" bail derived from the eighth
amendment. See generally United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 (1972); Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.
Fla. 1970). It could be argued that pretrial detention is merely a surrogate for bail
because both serve the same purpose-assuring the accused's presence at trial. If
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not allow the government to impose punishment without first accord-
ing the accused procedural due process consisting of a full criminal
trial before a duly constituted court."'6 But, while this procedural
right undoubtedly warrants some basic constitutional protection, it
is unclear whether it rises to the status of a fundamental substantive
right' 2 and, if so, whether it should apply to the routine aspects of
the detention scheme. 28
there exists a fundamental right to be free from excessive bail, then arguably there
exists a corresponding fundamental right to be free from excessive conditions of pre-
trial detention. Given these assumptions, the conditions of pretrial detention should
be strictly scrutinized to ensure that they do not violate the fundamental right to be
free from excessive conditions of confinement. See Comment, Pretrial Detainees Must
Be Held Under the Least Restrictive Means Possible to Assure the Detainees'
Presence at Trial, 3 FoaRHAm URB. L.J. 685, 691-92 (1975).
There are several problems with this hypothesis, however. First, in determining
whether bail has been set at an "excessive" figure, the Supreme Court has asked
merely whether the figure is reasonably calculated to assure presence at trial, not
whether it is the least restrictive amount capable of doing so. See Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951). Second, standing against the rare case advocating such a right are
a plethora of cases holding that there exists no absolute right to have bail set. See,
e.g., Bloss v. People, 421 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1970) (no federal constitutional right
to bail pending appeal); United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490, 491-92 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (defendants may be confined to avoid threats to potential witnesses); Mastrian
v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710 (8th Cir.) (state may refuse to provide bail for some
offenses), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964). Finally, freedom from excessive confine-
ment is more probably accomplished by the sufficiency of the bail hearing, rather than
by alteration of the routine conditions of post-bail hearing confinement.
126. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236-38 (1896); cf. Smith
v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969) (sixth amendment requires speedy trial so that
pretrial detention is not "undue or oppressive"). See generally Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Moore v.
Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567, 571 (D. Neb. 1976).
127. A major problem with recognizing a fundamental right to be free from state
imposed punishment is the uncertain breadth of its application due to the vagueness
of the term "punishment." For instance, the paddling of school children by a public
school teacher would certainly be state imposed punishment, but to accord this treat-
ment strict scrutiny would contradict the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (due process clause does not require notice and
hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment in public schools). Similarly, such
a fundamental liberty might have an undesirable impact on the judicial review process
of administrative decisions which, by statute, need only meet a rationality standard.
See, e.g., Brawner Bldg., Inc. v. Shehyn, 442 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (construing
role of judiciary for Administrative Procedure Act § 10(3), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976));
Haynes v. United States, 418 F.2d 1380, 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (same).
128. It is conceivable that a fundamental liberty to be free from physical punish-
ment was established by Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) ("It is funda-
mental that the state cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in
accordance with due process of law"). However, the Court's holdings in Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (procedural safeguard of probable cause hearing suffi-
cient due process to justify deprivations associated with pretrial detention), and Pell
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McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners29 undermines
the contention that such a right has fundamental status. McDonald
dealt with an Illinois statute administratively interpreted to pro-
hibit pretrial detainees from obtaining absentee ballots.2 0 Plaintiff
detainees had argued for an equal protection test similar to that
applied in Wolfish, 3' but the Supreme Court declined to use such a
test. Instead, it decided the case on fundamental right-to-vote
principles, holding that the challenged denial of absentee ballots was
too insignificant to trigger strict scrutiny; 132 thus, the statute was
tested only for rationality. 3
The salient aspect of McDonald was the Court's refusal to apply
strict scrutiny to a denial of voting rights, even though such a denial
certainly does not inhere in the mere fact of pretrial confinement. 34
Under the Wolfish rule this deprivation would require strict scrutiny
regardless of its impact on the right to vote. The Supreme Court has,
therefore, already forsaken the opportunity to recognize the hypo-
thetical fundamental liberty that is necessary to give the Wolfish rule
doctrinal consistency.
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974) (upon lawful incarceration, prisoners do not
retain fundamental liberties inconsistent with legitimate penal objectives such as insti-
tutional security), imply that even if such a fundamental right existed, lawfully incar-
cerated persons do not retain the full measure of its protection.
129. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
130. The challenged statute extended absentee voting rights to four classes of
persons: (1) those absent from the county of their residence for any reason whatsoever;
(2) those physically incapacitated; (3) those whose observance of religious holidays
precludes attendance at the polls; and (4) those serving as poll watchers in precincts
not their own. Id. at 803-04. The Board of Election Commissioners denied a request
for absentee ballots by Cook County Jail detainees, because they had not demon-
strated "phy.sical incapacity" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 804-05.
131. The detainees in McDonald argued for the following rule: "Not every conse-
quence of pre-trial detention is constitutionally permissible. Those restraints which are
not an essentialpart of the management of a prison, and which are not reasonably
related to the only legitimate purpose of detention-security, can not be justified
.... " Brief for Appellants at 11, McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802 (1969). This statement posits a two-part standard of review: (1) restraints that do
not inhere in prison management cannot be justified, and (2) restraints that do inhere
in prison management must be rationally related to security considerations. The rule
followed in Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bell v.
Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829), adopts a similar formula. See text accom-
panying note 108 supra.
132. 394 U.S. at 807. See generally note 49 supra.
133. 394 U.S. at 808-09.
134. "[C]ertainly there is nothing in the record of this case .. to suggest that
denial of absentee ballots to incarcerated qualified voters awaiting trial is essential to
the proper management of the Cook County Jail or of any other penal institution."
Brief for Appellants at 11, McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802
(1969).
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B. IMPRACTICABILITY OF THE Wolfish RULE
Aside from its doctrinal problem, the Wolfish rule suffers from a
practical flaw. It requires courts to make difficult distinctions be-
tween conditions that inhere in confinement and those that do not.
Not all cases are difficult. Clearly, conditions equated with pun-
ishment do not inhere in pretrial confinement.'35 Certain traditional
benchmarks exist that aid in determining, for unconvicted detainees,
the point at which mere confinement ends and punishment begins.
Such punishment clearly includes being subjected to shocking or in-
humane conditions, '3 and, in most cases, being treated materially
worse than convicted inmates housed in the same facility. 137 But
when such traditional indicia are not present, it is extremely difficult
for courts to determine whether a certain condition inheres in con-
finement. Rather than make this difficult subjective distinction,
courts adopting this rule have simply applied strict scrutiny to every
challenged aspect of pretrial detention. 38
135. See note 87 supra.
136. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371
F. Supp. 594, 636 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Brenneman v. Madi-
gan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
137. A number of courts have stated that detainees must be treated better
than convicts. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582, 595 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567, 574 (D. Neb. 1976) (dictum); Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp.
268, 272 (D.N.H. 1972). This rule was questioned, however, in Feeley v. Sampson, 570
F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978). The court held that the rule was not "conclusive," reasoning
that in many situations a fair comparison between detainees and convicts cannot be
made either because they pose significantly different security risks, id. at 371, or
because they are housed in different facilities. Id. at 573, 575.
138. See Wolfish v. Levi, 438 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 573 F.2d 118 (1st Cir.), cert. granted sub. nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.
Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829); Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977)
(jail conditions held shocking on facts), aff'd in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286
(8th Cir. 1978); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 623 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 507 F.2d
333 (2d Cir. 1974).
A recent example of a court's inability to draw this distinction is Bell v. Manson,
590 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1978). Two judges, on a three-judge panel, voted to reverse
the lower court because the trial judge had applied the rational basis test in assessing
a jail's practice of strip searching pretrial detainees returning from outside visits. See
id. at 1225. They held that Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829), required that such searches
be justified by compelling necessity, see Bell v. Manson, 590 F.2d at 1226, the impli-
cation being that the procedure did not inhere in confinement. Judge Lumbard, dis-
senting, took the opposite view:
In Wolfish . . . we did not rule out all routine strip searches. ...
[I]t is obvious that the safety of all persons incarcerated in [the
Bridgeport Community Correctional Center], as well as the safety of prison
personnel, requires some search of prisoners returning to prison after they
have been in contact with others in connection with court appearances or
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Although the Wolfish court called attention to this problem, it
proposed no criteria to be used by trial courts in determining which
conditions inhere in confinement. In fact, the court resolved many of
the issues before it on appeal without referring to the standard of
review it was applying. Judging from the only two issues obviously
resolved by the rationality test-the propriety of the trial judge's
orders that detainees not be held for more than sixty days'39 and that
they be permitted to wear their own clothes"4 -it seems possible that
the "inhere in confinement" formula is merely a labelling device
designed to free Second Circuit courts from resolving issues they
consider too trivial for judicial consideration. If so, the Wolfish ver-
sion of the strict scrutiny rule is functionally identical to the now
questionable majority rule of blanket strict scrutiny; it simply in-
corporates the requirement that an issue be significant before it war-
rants strict scrutiny.
C. THE Wolfish RULE As AN UNNECESSARY APPLICATION OF STRICT
SCRUTINY
A strict scrutiny standard of review is not necessary to achieve a
desirable level of protection for detainees. Since the traditional ra-
tional relation test is perceived as offering minimal protection from
oppressive regulation,' it is understandable that a majority of courts
have preferred a standard of review that explicitly calls for a high
level of protection. The fear that the Feeley rule neglects the substan-
tive rights of detainees, however, is unfounded.
The Feeley court recognized that the state has a single legitimate
other outside visits. I would think that the question of how such a search can
best be.made in light of prison conditions, and the available prison person-
nel, is appropriately left to the informed judgment of the state officials
charged with the management and safety of state prison facilities.
Id. at 1227 (Lunibard, J., dissenting). Since Judge Lumbard would have affirmed the
lower court's holding, it is clear that he believed that such a strip search-one absent
any evidence on the record of abusive language or offensive touching by the
guards-inheres in confinement.
139. 573 F.2d at 129.
140. Id. at 132-33.
141. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it"); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to [meet the require-
ments of due process]"; it is enough that the measure is a rational way to correct the
evil at hand); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
There is language in McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809
(1969), resembling the minimum rationality standard. This Note suggests, however,
that McDonald should not be interpreted as a paradigm of minimum rationality, but
as an example of a jail regulation being tested for punitive intent. See text accompany-
ing notes 155-58 infra.
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interest in restraining detainees: assuring their presence at trial.'
Although this interest encompasses reasonable security measures,4 3
the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held, in a post-Feeley decision,
that it does not include administrative convenience.'44 Rehabilitation
and deterrence are also clearly not within the state's legitimate inter-
est in assuring presence at trial.' Finally, it is beyond question that
punishment of detainees is considered a denial of due process. Thus,
under Feeley, conditions that are inhumane or "shock the consci-
ence" are obviously unlawful,'46 as are conditions that are materially
worse for detainees than similarly situated convicts.'47 This extraordi-
nary narrowing of legitimate interests the state may proffer in sup-
port of regulations affecting detainees elevates the Feeley test to an
intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. The court's selection of the
rationality standard is, therefore, not outcome-determinative in
favor of the state. This observation is borne out by existing law. The
history of the minority rule, which Feeley epitomizes, is replete with
instances of jail regulations being found irrational.'
VI. THE PUNITIVE INTENT TEST
A problem with the Feeley rule is that courts may apply it as
though it were a minimum rationality standard. Since the Feeley
rule's superiority is conditioned on the fact that it grants detainees
some measure of heightened protection, it is desirable that courts
more explicitly state the contours of this unique standard of rational-
ity.
142. 570 F.2d at 368-69.
143. Id. at 369; see note 85 supra and accompanying text.
144. DiMarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir.) (jail ordered, by court applying
Feeley standard, to hire sufficient personnel to provide adequate conditions), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 312 (1978).
145. See note 87 supra.
146. "It is impossible to conceive of situations where treatment so cruel or bar-
baric as to violate the eighth amendment if visited upon a sentenced prisoner would
satisfy a detainee's due process rights." 570 F.2d at 370.
147. See discussion of Feeley in note 137 supra.
148. See DiMarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir.) (district court's order that
additional prison staff be hired may be affirmed even under a standard less rigorous
than strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 312 (1978); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d
364, 372 (1st Cir. 1978) (regulation allowing detainee visitation "at all reasonable
times" unlawful since it gives jail administrators arbitrary control, on an ad hoc basis,
over visitation); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1000 (3d Cir. 1976) (district court erred
in dismissing complaint alleging lack of visiting privileges, lack of sufficient tele-
phones, and an inadequate opportunity for exercise and recreation, since these depri-
vations were not necessarily reasonable in relation to the state's sole purpose of assur-
ing detainees' presence at trial); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823,
827 (3d Cir. 1976) (state violated due process clause by arbitrarily imposing materially
greater restrictions on detainees than on convicted prisoners in same facility).
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This can be accomplished by conducting the rationality analysis
in terms of "punitive intent." Since the basic issue in most cases
brought by detainees is whether they are being punished rather than
merely confined, it can be said that the conditions of pretrial deten-
tion are reasonable regulatory measures so long as they do not
amount to punishment. The punitive intent doctrine is eminently
suited to such a substantive due process analysis of detainee com-
plaints.
In determining whether a regulation constitutes punishment, the
Supreme Court has looked for "unmistakable evidence of punitive
intent.""' This evidence may be subjective: "[w]hether the legisla-
tive aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether
the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident
to a regulation of a present situation .. ". . 1,0 In Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,,' the Court identified objective criteria that in-
dicate whether punitive intent exists:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, ...
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence,. . . whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned .... 52
Under the Kennedy test, a regulation is not punishment simply
because it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint. 3 Whether
a condition of confinement has historically been considered punish-
ment may, however, be determinative.' 54 The Kennedy test does not
bind courts to uphold regulations simply because they bear some
minimally rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. A court is
free to decide that a regulation is excessive even though minimally
rational.
The punitive intent doctrine provides an explanation of the Su-
preme Court's decision in McDonald v. Board of Election
149. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
150. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (plurality).
151. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
152. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
153. "If the statute imposes a disability for the purpose of punishment-that is,
to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-it has been considered penal. But
a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but
to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 96 (1958) (plurality) (footnote omitted), cited in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. at 170.
154. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (detained
aliens awaiting deportation may not be put to hard labor since it has historically been
treated as an "infamous punishment" for which conviction of a crime is the due process
prerequisite).
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Commissioners, 5 in which a statute was held to be rational although
it denied detainees the opportunity to obtain absentee ballots.,'" In
Illinois, prior to the enactment of the statute, certain classes of people
were unable to obtain absentee ballots. The statute extended absen-
tee voting privileges to many of them, but not to detainees. Clearly,
the statute was intended to be ameliorative, not punitive; it was in
the nature of a voting reform." 7 The McDonald Court held that the
reform's failure to cover every possible beneficiary was not grounds
for reversal'5 absent a showing of punitive intent.
The punitive intent doctrine is well suited to deciding issues that
do not easily lend themselves to resolution by a more generalized
statement of the rationality rule. For example, lower federal courts
have reached conflicting results on such issues as whether detainees
may have contact visits,"9 or whether jails may subject detainees to
strip searches"0 after they return from court appearances or other
outside visits. These decisions may be reconciled utilizing the
Kennedy "excessiveness" criteria.
Undoubtedly, denying detainees contact visits bears some mini-
mally rational relationship to the state's interest in jail security. In
many jails, however, such a denial would be an excessive reaction to
a minor problem.'9 ' On the other hand, such a denial might not be
155. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
156. See notes 129-34 supra and accompanying text.
157. See 394 U.S. at 809-11. The primary purpose of the challenged statute was
to extend absentee voting privileges to additional classes of persons. See id. at 803-04;
note 130 supra.
158. [A] legislature traditionally has been allowed to take reform 'one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind,' . . . and a legislature need not run the
risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed ... to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.
394 U.S. at 809 (citation omitted).
159. Compare Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1977) (contact
visits permitted), with Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 373 (1st Cir. 1978) (contact
visits not permitted).
160. Compare Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829) (strip search may not include genital
or anal inspection unless there is probable cause to believe the inmate is concealing
contraband), and Black v. Amico, 387 F. Supp. 88, 91 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (strip search
of pretrial detainee's visitor is unlawful where no real suspicion of introducing contra-
band exists), with Bell v. Manson, 427 F. Supp. 450, 452 (D. Conn. 1976) (practice of
strip and rectal search is reasonably designed to support security and internal order
at the jail), rev'd, 590 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1978), and Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406
F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (not unreasonable to strip search pretrial detainees
who have been classified as security risks).
161. See Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 748-49 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1977) (contact
visits permitted when defendant failed to present direct evidence of alleged threats to
jail security).
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excessive in an older jail with minimal security arrangements and a
serious contraband problem. "' The same analysis applies to strip
searches. This practice has been disallowed when the record discloses
it is of little demonstrable utility and has the effect of humiliating
those who must submit to it.' But it has been argued that the prac-
tice is reasonable where the element of overt punitive intent is miss-
ing and the security interest is valid. "'
Using the punitive intent test to determine the rationality of jail
regulations under the Feeley standard should lead to more consistent
judicial review of detainee conplaints. Moreover, its use should allay
the fear that the Feeley rational basis standard would not offer detai-
nees adequate protection from administrative excesses.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions have created considerable con-
fusion regarding the standard of judicial review appropriate when
pretrial detainees challenge the administrative decisions of their jail-
ers. Of the possible standards considered in this Note, the best is that
the decisions of jail administrators need be only rationally related to
the state's interest in assuring detainees' presence at trial, unless
such decisions significantly interfere with a fundamental liberty. If
such significant interference is present, the decisions must pass the
strict scrutiny test. The danger that lower courts may mistakenly
construe this rule as requiring only minimum rationality can be miti-
gated by incorporating the punitive intent test as the standard's
measure of rationality. A rationality standard, so understood, would
offer detainees heightened protection while guarding against the
dangers of overreaching strict scrutiny.
162. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 367, 373 (1st Cir. 1978).
163. See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nora. Bell
v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 76 (1978) (No. 77-1829).
164. See generally Bell v. Manson, 427 F. Supp. 450, 451-52 (D. Conn. 1976),
rev'd, 590 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1978); Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F. Supp. 836, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Bell v. Manson, 590 F.2d 1224, 1226-28 (2d Cir. 1978) (Lum-
bard, C.J., dissenting).
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Addendum
As this issue went to print, the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 47 U.S.L.W. 4507 (May 14, 1979). In Bell,
both the majority and Mr. Justice Stevens in dissent concluded that
it was inappropriate for courts to subject routine conditions of pre-
trial confinement to strict scrutiny. Instead, the Court stated, the
proper inquiry is whether such conditions amount to punishment. It
adopted the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez* test as the standard
for determining whether such conditions amount to punishment or
are merely valid regulatory restraints.
* See notes i49-60 supra and accompanying text.
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